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Animism
KATHERINE SWANCUTT King's College London
Animism is a particular sensibility and way of relating to various beings in the world. It involves attributing sentience to other
beings that may include persons, animals, plants, spirits, the environment, or even items of technology, such as cars, robots, or
computers. Through ethnographic examples drawn from animistic societies worldwide, this entry examines key themes in the
study of animism, from principles of animation to attributing sentience to animal spirits and animistic places. Since early and
contemporary anthropological approaches to animism are often grounded in the principles, philosophies, and conclusions of
modern science, anthropologists use a variety of concepts such as immanence, transcendence, or disenchantment to understand
animistic sensibilities. By contrast, animistic persons do not rely upon the concepts of scholars to understand their own worlds.
Recently, anthropologists have approached animism as a particular ‘ontology’ in the world, bringing it into conversation with
related ontologies such as totemism, analogism, naturalism, and a newly proposed homologism. These and other terms are
briefly explained while humour and reflexive awareness are explored as themes that push anthropologists to re-envision the
effects of imagination and creativity in a variety of animistic worlds. 
Introduction
Animism is both a concept and a way of relating to the world. The person or social group with an ‘animistic’
sensibility attributes sentience – or the quality of being ‘animated’ – to a wide range of beings in the world,
such as the environment, other persons, animals, plants, spirits, and forces of nature like the ocean, winds,
sun, or moon. Some animistic persons or social groups furthermore attribute sentience to things like
stones, metals, and minerals or items of technology, such as cars, robots, or computers. Principles of
animation and questions of being are thus key to animism. That said, animism is best understood not only
in terms of what it is, but in terms of what it is not. At first glance, animism seems to conjure up a coherent
and deliberate ideology of sorts, as it ends in an ‘ism’. But animism is really more a sensibility, tendency, or
style of engaging with the world and the beings or things that populate it. It is not a form of materialism,
which posits that only matter, materials, and movement exist. Nor is animism a form of monotheism, which
posits a single god in the universe. And, it is not a form of polytheism that posits many gods. 
Instead, to an animistic person or social group, sentience is often envisioned as a vital force, life force, or
animated property that is ‘immanent’, accessible, and ‘ready to hand’ in the everyday world, even if this
property  is  usually  latent  and  not  perceivable.  There  is  often  an  important  contrast  between  the
‘immanence’ of animistic sensibilities and the ‘transcendent’ qualities attributed to a monotheistic god or
polytheistic gods, which are related to as beings that exist apart from the everyday lives of human beings. 
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Just what it is that animates any particular being or thing can vary between different animistic persons and
societies. Urban shamans in Stockholm tend to approach the world with an animistic sensibility that is
rather different to that of Lutheran Swedes, when they consider that ‘everything is alive and permeated
with “Spirit”’ in a world comprised of both the “ordinary”, physical reality we live in [… and] another,
“alternative” reality, inhabited by living forms or energies sometimes seen as “Spirits”’ (Lindquist 1997:
13). Yet another kind of animistic sensibility is found among the indigenous Siberian hunters known as
Yukaghir,  who ‘differentiate between conscious and unconscious beings’ (Willerslev 2007: 73).  As the
anthropologist  Rane Willerslev  observes,  ‘[a]n  elderly  Yukaghir  hunter,  Vasili  Shalugin,  told  me that
animals, trees, and rivers are “people like us” (Rus. lyudi kak my) because they move, grow, and breathe,
but they are distinct from inanimate objects such as stones, skis, and food products, which, he claimed, are
alive but immovable’ (2007: 73). Some Yukaghir further consider that static things are not people because
they only have one soul (known as the ‘shadow-ayibii’), while active things are considered to be people
since they have additional souls, which make them move and grow (the ‘heart-ayibii’) as well as breathe
(the ‘head-ayibii’) for example (Willerslev 2007: 73). 
These two ethnographic studies point to seminal  themes in the study of  animism. One theme is  the
existence of various kinds of ‘spirits’ and ‘souls’. Spirits are understood in a broad sense that encompasses
the spirits of beings or things, deities, and energies. Souls are often the spirits of beings and things,
depending on the social context. There is no set definition for animism, just as there is no set definition for
spirits or souls. Yet a general feel for how the terms animism, spirits, and souls are understood can be
gleaned from the ways that scholars (and, in some cases, animistic persons) apply them to social contexts.
Urban Swedish shamans and Siberian Yukaghirs,  for example, hold in common the animistic logic of
immanence. Animistic sensibilities may appear at any moment and thus pervade the societies of Swedish
urban shamans and Yukaghirs alike. 
A second theme in the study of animism revolves around the attribution of personhood. For the Yukaghir,
active things like animals, trees, and rivers are ‘people like us’ because, like human beings, they possess
certain kinds of souls. It is these shared souls that imbue animals, trees, and rivers with a sentience that
enables them like humans to move, grow, and breathe. By contrast, static things like stones, skis, and food
products are ‘not persons’ because they only share one soul in common with humans and lack the kind of
sentience that would enable them to move and show signs of animated life, consciousness, and motivation.
Not all beings or things have the same animistic sensibilities in the Yukaghir ‘life-world’, which is quite
literally a world that is largely alive to sentience. Yet – and this might perhaps go against the reader’s
expectations – we find a more comprehensive case of animistic immanence in the life-world of urban
Swedish shamans, who relate to ‘everything’ like a living person who is filled with Spirit. 
Given this difference in animistic sensibilities, the following questions arise: Is there an archetypal form of
animism in which spirits or souls animate all beings, as is the case among urban Swedish shamans? If so,
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could this form have undergone a process of ‘diminution’ or ‘disenchantment’ in some societies, which
caused  certain  of  their  animistic  sensibilities  to  become  less  important  or  widespread?  Would
disenchantment explain why Yukaghir view their stones, skis, or food products as being ‘not people’?
Conversely, have Swedish urban shamans sought to inhabit a ‘re-enchanted’ world, where everything has
Spirit? 
Note that while these terms and questions need to be explained by scholars of animism, they do not need to
be explained to animistic persons who already relate to the world with animistic sensibilities. Yukaghirs
would not need to use scholarly terms such as immanence, life-world, disenchantment, or diminution in
order to understand how an animistic sensibility works. They already inhabit a life-world in which there are
clear relationships between souls, beings and things – relationships that separate ‘people like us’ from
those that are ‘not people’.  
Anthropologists, ethnologists, ethnographers, folklorists, religious studies experts, and popular experts
alike have grappled with the aforementioned specialist  terms when reflecting upon the multitude of
animistic societies,  both in the contemporary world and historically.  It  is  thus important to note the
sometimes subtle but key difference between the persons who live animistic lives and those who study
animistic  persons  but  are  not  necessarily  animistic  themselves.  Revealing  discrepancies  often  arise
between the  animistic  sensibilities  of  the  persons  of  study  and  the  sensibilities  of  scholars.  This  is
particularly obvious among anthropologists, who have been leading figures in the study of animism. Both
early and contemporary anthropologists often approach animism in an ‘as-if’ manner that suggests they
themselves do not relate to the world in an animistic way. Nonetheless, many current anthropological
works on animism are subsumed under what Graham Harvey, in a neo-pagan and eco-friendly vein, dubs
the  ‘new  animism’  (2017  [2005]:  xvii-xviii).  With  this  term,  Harvey  describes  the  approach  of
anthropologists who are aware that their concepts contrast with the assumptions of early anthropologists.
But this does not mean that scholars of the new animism always refute modern beliefs that nothing exists
beyond the natural world, which is grounded in the philosophies, principles, methods, and conclusions of
the sciences. 
Animal spirits and animistic places
Studies of animism often point out the importance of animal spirits and places that are sacred or charged
with animistic potentialities. Animal spirits refer to the spirits or souls attributed to animals that may be
considered the seat  of  an animal’s  consciousness  and motivation.  These studies  show how animistic
potentialities go beyond the human subject.
In animistic societies, animals frequently show their sentience, awareness, and motivation to act through
their relationships to human beings. Diverse ways of relating to animal sentience are revealed by the ways
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that hunters and shamans in particular treat animal spirits. Siberian Eveny, for example, consider that the
spirits of the animals they hunt in the harsh Arctic climate are master-parents to all humans. As parents,
animal spirits may take pity on their children – which include Eveny persons – by offering themselves up as
food to eat. A hunted animal does not make this sacrifice lightly, but ‘will “give itself up” only when the
relation between hunter and prey is hierarchical’ – that is, when the human being needs to eat meat to
survive (Willerslev & Ulturgasheva 2012: 55). But like parents, animal spirits are manipulated by Eveny,
who trick them into giving themselves up to justify their acts of killing. To this end, hunters seek to
establish ‘social contact’ with prey animals in a way that makes them appear vulnerable and child-like
(Willerslev & Ulturgasheva 2012: 53). This is no easy task, since Eveny hunters acquire a ‘closed body’ with
age that protects against attacks from the spirits of game animals. Hunters therefore must ‘re-open’ their
bodies to mimic a child or use a child as ‘bait’ to attract a game animal that will pity the hungry child
(Willerslev & Ulturgasheva 2012: 55). The child’s first hunt is organised around this tactic, in which the
animal is attracted into close range by the child so the adult hunter can kill it. Then the hunter tasks the
child with carrying the prey home on the back of a guardian reindeer, which wards off revenge from the
animal’s spirit. While the animal’s spirit will pity the child and its guardian reindeer, both of which it
considers to be its children, it may take revenge on the adult hunter for tricking it into giving itself up.
Thus, the Eveny hunter implores the animal’s spirit after the kill that, ‘“you came to me out of your own
free will, please have pity on us and do not harm us”’ (Willerslev & Ulturgasheva 2012: 55). 
Conversely, among the Waorani of Amazonian Ecuador, revenge killings can be carried out on shamans
who purportedly use animal spirits to conduct witchcraft (High 2012: 130). Waorani fear these killings,
which can set in motion a dangerous cycle of deaths that may continue even after the errant shaman has
died. Here, the logic of animal consciousness and motivation is different to that found among the Eveny.
Since the shaman’s body ‘is inhabited by his adopted jaguar-spirit (meñi)’ at night, when it may attack and
kill any named persons, Waorani warn each other against speaking with shamans during this dangerous
time. Note that, unlike Eveny who trick animal spirits and plead with them not to take revenge, Waorani
jaguar-spirits must be avoided at all costs. Their danger is compounded by the fact that Waorani shamans
relate to jaguar-spirits  like adopted children who will  reciprocate care to their  masters.  Thus,  when
Waorani carry out revenge killings, they may find that the shaman’s ‘orphaned jaguar-spirit continues to
live and kill people out of sadness and anger for its adopted father’ (High 2012: 130).
Consciousness and motivation in animistic societies is attributed not just to animals, but also to certain
places. For example, Yup’ik residents of the Bering Sea coast consider that the ocean has eyes, sees
everything, and does not like it when persons fail to follow the traditional abstinence practice of avoiding
the waterfront after a birth, death, illness, miscarriage, or first menstruation (Fienup-Riordan & Carmack
2011: 269). Since the ocean brings disasters on people when it is upset, Yup’ik consider that it is best to
wait until early spring before visiting it after one of these events. Spring is the season when grebes arrive
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and defecate in the water; it is also when ringed seals come and their blood soaks the ocean as predators
attack. According to Yup’ik hunters, these events make ‘the makuat [ocean’s eyes] close and become blind’
so that the hunters can safely approach the waterfront again (Fienup-Riordan & Carmack 2011: 270). 
Similarly, consciousness and motivation can be found in the fires of sacred hearths, which must be treated
with respect as spirits reside in and around them. Among the Nenets tundra dwellers of the Siberian Yamal
peninsula, women of reproductive age do not cross through the sacred space by the fireplace or hang
clothes to dry above it that would be worn on the lower part of their bodies (Skvirskaja 2012: 151). Nenets
men, however, store their possessions in this sacred space that serves as the place for hosting respected
visitors. The Nenets fireplace reveals ‘the capacity of “things” to objectify some forms of gender relations
at the expense of others’ (Skvirskaja 2012: 152). 
Moreover,  in  animistic  societies,  places  may be  imbued with  memory.  Certain  burial  sites  for  Daur
Mongolian shamans in northeast China have been covered by stone cairns known as ovoo, where Buddhist
rituals now attract ‘all manner of princes, dignitaries and foreigners’, while drawing upon the memories
and powers of both the shamanic spirits and Buddhist deities that were imbued in these locales (Humphrey
with Onon 1996: 133). In a related light, the Western Apache of North America consider that certain
locations contain memories and the wisdom to help people to make the right decisions. To Western Apache,
a ‘visually unique’ place is like ‘a watertight vessel’ that holds ‘wisdom, [which] like water, is basic to
survival’ (Basso 1996: 76). Since ‘wisdom sits in places’, they learn to memorise wisdom-filled stories about
wisdom-filled places that can help them to address problems in a measured way (Basso 1996: 67).
Animism in early anthropology
Building  upon  the  findings  of  historians,  folklorists,  travellers,  traders,  missionaries,  and  expedition
members about the religious lives of peoples around the globe, Edward B. Tylor introduced the study of
animism within anthropology. Although the term ‘animism’ can be traced to the Latin anima for breath, life,
or spirit, Tylor borrowed it from George Ernst Stahl, an eighteenth-century chemist and physician, who
proposed that the spirits or souls of living beings or things control physical processes in the body. Like
Stahl, Tylor wanted to discuss the relationship between the soul and all forms of life. However, Tylor set
out to shift the meaning of animism to encompass what he called ‘the groundwork of the Philosophy of
Religion’ (1977 [1871]: 426). According to Tylor, animism is a form of religion in which the spirits and souls
of humans and other beings are considered necessary for life. As Tylor was interested in the origins of
religious views and how they develop over time, he hypothesised that persons adopt an animistic sensibility
when reflecting on ‘the differences between a living body and a dead one’ as well as on ‘those human
shapes which appear in dreams and visions’ (1977 [1871]: 428). He illustrates how human spirits appear in
dreams or visions through numerous examples, like this one of the Zulu in Southern Africa: 
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the Zulu may be visited in a dream by the shade of an ancestor, the itongo, who comes to warn him of
danger, or he may himself be taken by the itongo in a dream to visit his distant people, and see that they
are in trouble; as for the man who is passing into the morbid condition of the professional seer, phantoms
are continually coming to talk to him in his sleep, till he becomes, as the expressive native phrase is, “a
house of dreams” (Tylor 1977 [1871]: 443). 
According to Tylor, experiences such as these suggest that human beings have a soul that can appear to
them. Through his extensive catalogue of dreamt phenomena, Tylor showed that persons dream of animal
souls (1977 [1871]: 467-74), plant souls (1977 [1871]: 474-6), and even the souls of objects (1977 [1871]:
477, see also 478-80). On this basis, he suggested that persons who attribute souls to human beings,
animals, plants, or objects gradually consider that the soul is not only a vital force to specific beings but is
pervasive throughout the cosmos and imbued in all beings. Thus, he argued that the souls of humans,
animals, plants, and objects survive death and bodily decay in an animistic cosmos, while inhabiting a
world that is populated with spirits and deities (Tylor 1977 [1871]: 426).
Tylor championed the social evolutionary approach in anthropology that suggested that people progress
from a ‘primitive’ stage of social life, in which they try to control the world around them with magical or
religious practices, towards a so-called ‘modern’ life based on the philosophies, principles, and conclusions
of science (1977 [1871]: 26-35). The influence of social evolutionism waned in anthropology in the early
twentieth century, as anthropologists started to undertake their own fieldwork and obtained findings that
cast serious doubt on the idea that societies represent levels of linear human progress. Despite extensive
criticisms  of  it,  social  evolutionism  never  entirely  disappeared  from  anthropology  or  from  popular
understandings in Euro-American societies about human cultures. Moreover, since Tylor presented his
study of animism as evidence for the social evolutionary approach, the two became synonymous for some
time. However, it is possible to study animism without the comparative evolutionary angle. Contemporary
anthropological  approaches  show  that  modern  technologies  and  science  are  also  incorporated  into
animistic worlds.
Contemporary approaches and the ‘new animism’
In the shamanic journeys of the Chewong hunter,  gatherer,  and shifting cultivators of the Malaysian
rainforest, new items of technology and ‘some species previously not thought of as people, may reveal
themselves as such’ (Howell 2016: 63). Technological items can become people in the Chewong world
through the assistance of  shamans,  who use the same word to refer to their  spirit-guides and their
consciousness. Thus, shamans ‘who have established a permanent relationship with a spirit-guide (ruwai)
can send their consciousness (ruwai) on a journey into space [… where] any being or object may appear as
a conscious being’ (Howell 2016: 63). Japanese airplanes, for example, became recognised as new spirit-
guides that have consciousness after they flew over Chewong forests during World War II. A Chewong
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shaman’s song, still sung today, ‘refers to the ruwai of Japanese airplanes’ (Howell 2016: 63). In a not
dissimilar way, several American pilots who crashed into the Liangshan mountains of Southwest China and
were rescued by the Nuosu, a Tibeto-Burman pastoral and agricultural group, have been incorporated into
their animistic creation epic known as the ‘Book of origins’. As folklorist Mark Bender and Nuosu poet Aku
Wuwu explain, these WWII pilots and the early twentieth century French, English, and American explorers
who visited the Liangshan highlands appear to have been lumped together in this Nuosu animistic myth,
which contains recent additions on the ‘Foreigners’ lineage’ and ‘Migrations of foreigners’ (2019).
Recent works on animism, such as these, suggest that a broad understanding of different life-worlds and
relationships is needed when we reflect upon what is substantively ‘real’ in an animistic world. It is in this
spirit  that  Kathleen Richardson (2016)  has  introduced the concept  of  ‘technological  animism’,  which
describes cases where the boundaries between literature and technoscience are crossed in the production
and reception of robots. Like many other robots, the famous ASIMO (Advanced Step in Innovative Mobility)
was made by Honda in Japan to resemble children so that its human creators and owners would engage
with it as a cute, non-threatening, and childlike being. This marketing strategy was particularly important
for roboticists in Euro-America ‘to counteract popular notions that robots are threatening to humanity and
hyper-sophisticated’ (Richardson 2016: 115). Revealingly, the appeal of childlike robots to their Euro-
American or Japanese owners resonates with the appeal of the childlike ‘open bodies’ that Eveny hunters
present to the spirits of game animals so that they will pity them and give themselves up. 
Relating to other beings as though they were kin is, then, a pervasive theme in current studies of animism
(Bird-David 1999, 2018). While some relationships may be conceptualised in a parent-child form or ‘in an
idiom of siblingship’, as among the Bentian of Indonesian Borneo (Sillander 2016: 171), it is not uncommon
to find that kinship terms are extended to other-than-human beings or things in animistic societies, which
may also share a common point of origin with humans (Brightman, Grotti & Ulturgasheva 2012: 8). But to
stand the test of time, animistic relationships to other beings or things often need to be maintained. Thus,
among the Bidayuhs of Sarawak, Malaysian Borneo, young Christians who wanted to move away from the
animistic sensibilities of their parents have chosen to forget (or never properly learn) how to relate to
animistic spirits, which ‘were deemed more forgiving of plain ignorance of the rules than of absent-minded
transgressions’ (Chua 2009: 338).
What these studies suggest is the importance not only of thinking about different animisms in the plural,
but of recognising – as Morten Pedersen suggests for peoples across North Asia, from Siberia to Mongolia –
that animistic sensibilities often only come into focus in the right circumstances, contexts, and moments
(2001: 415-20). A person may need certain faculties, such as an imaginative ‘openness’ to the world, to
perceive the animistic sensibilities of other beings and things (Ingold 2006: 11-2, see also 18-9; 2013: 739,
see also 741-2). Religious specialists, such as shamans, are often attributed with ‘inspired’ qualities that
enable them to perceive animistic sensibilities that remain imperceptible to ordinary persons (Humphrey
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with Onon 1996). ‘Astonishment’ (Ingold 2006, 2013) or ‘wonder’ (Scott 2014) have thus become leitmotifs
among scholars who seek to show how persons perceive and relate to animistic beings, things, forces, and
experiences. 
Much of  the  expansive  thinking in  the  new animism is  traceable  to  Alfred Irving Hallowell’s  1930s
fieldwork among the Berens River Ojibwe of North America, which was punctuated by lively vignettes
about the supernatural Thunder Birds, called pinési, which are giant birds that create thunder by clapping
their  wings.  In  his  1960  study  of  ‘Ojibwa  ontology,  behavior,  and  world  view’,  Hallowell  invites
anthropologists to rethink their life-worlds and those of animistic societies on the basis of his Ojibwe
research. Hallowell ‘deeply identified’ with the animistic sensibilities of the Ojibwe and advocated that
anthropologists routinely identify with their interlocutors as a way of enriching their anthropology and lives
in general (Strong 2017: 468). His study shows that Ojibwe do not attribute animistic qualities to all beings
or things at all times, but that they are open to finding that some beings or things may have animistic
qualities in certain moments. Thus, Hallowell observes that while some Ojibwe have seen certain stones
move in ceremonies, stones usually do not move and many people do not see them move. Similarly, he gives
the story of an Ojibwe boy who claimed to have seen a Thunder Bird during a heavy storm – a story that
was at first received sceptically by his parents because seeing ‘other-than-human persons’ is not a common
Ojibwe  experience.  Ultimately,  this  sighting  of  the  Thunder  Bird  was  accepted  when  ‘a  man  who
had dreamed of pinési verified the boy’s description’ (Hallowell 1960: 32; cited also in Strong 2017: 470).
Revealingly, the boy’s parents were persuaded not by the fact that the Thunder Bird was identified by two
different persons, but by the fact that the dreamer had perceived the same qualities in pinési as their son
had seen during the thunderstorm. Ojibwe consider that people are especially open to perceiving animistic
beings in dreams, where they routinely encounter them. Thus, the astonishing similarity between the
inspired visions of a Thunder Bird seen by the boy during the storm, and later in another man’s dream, is
what convinced his parents.
Animism as an ontology
As  Pauline  Turner  Strong  observes,  Hallowell’s  Ojibwe  study  presaged  ‘an  ontological  return’  in
contemporary anthropology, which brought a renewed focus to principles of animation and questions of
being (2017: 468). While animism (and Tylor’s approach to it) fell out of fashion in anthropology after the
1920s,  the interest  in animistic sensibilities remained vibrant,  as Hallowell’s  1930s fieldwork attests.
Ethnographic studies documented animistic ways of being and continued to fill the shelves of anthropology
and other disciplines, albeit often without using the term ‘animism’ again until the 1990s, when it regained
popularity.  This  does not  mean that  ethnography always took the lead in anthropological  studies on
ontologies, some of which have instead been built upon philosophical or theoretical considerations inspired
by ethnography (compare to Scott 2013).
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Philippe Descola’s  ‘fourfold schema of  ontologies’  –  comprised of  animism, totemism, analogism, and
naturalism –  provides  a  vocabulary  for  discussing  the  kinds  of  worlds  that  anthropologists  envision
philosophically, theoretically, and in the light of ethnographic fieldwork (2014: 275; see also 2013). In
Descola’s terms, the quintessential animistic ontology is a world characterised by ‘a continuity of souls and
a discontinuity of bodies’ between humans and nonhumans (2014: 275). Each animistic being has a shared
interior quality, such as a soul or vital life force. But Descola suggests that there are different kinds of
bodies in any given animist world, such as the human body or the body of specific animals, plants, objects,
and even spirits whose ‘bodies’ may be composed of an airy, wraith-like, or translucent substance. This
difference in bodies makes for different kinds of animist beings, each of which has a soul and ‘possess[es]
social characteristics: they live in villages, abide by kinship rules and ethical codes, they engage in ritual
activity and barter goods’ (Descola 2014: 275). 
According  to  Descola,  there  are  important  differences  between  animistic,  totemic,  analogic,  and
naturalistic ontologies. Totemic ontologies are common in Oceania, where persons and nonhuman beings
share the same interior quality, such as a soul, and the same bodily substance, such as a physicality
inherited through kinship  to  other-than-human totemic  ancestors.  By  contrast,  Descola  suggests  that
analogic ontologies are common south of Siberia, in parts of Asia where persons and nonhuman beings do
not share the same interior quality or the same bodily substance. Animal domestication is a hallmark of
analogic ontologies because the use and consumption of animals lends itself to the view that the interior
and bodily qualities of humans and nonhumans are different. Finally, naturalistic ontologies are common
across Euro-America, where persons and nonhuman beings do not share the same interior quality, such as
a soul, but do share the same bodily substance, namely a physicality traceable to taxonomies of species and
evolutionary lines of descent. 
Not everyone agrees with Descola’s approach. There have been famous debates, for example, between
Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro on animism and perspectivism (Latour 2009; Turner 2009: 27).
Viveiros de Castro (1998, 2004) introduced ‘perspectivism’ as a term that puts a new spin onto what
Descola calls animism. Drawing upon ethnographies of Amerindian peoples in Amazonia, Viveiros de Castro
suggests that all beings in a perspectival ontology can adopt a human perspective, albeit under certain
circumstances that are conducive for them doing so. Whereas Descola considers that animism (and its
variant, perspectivism) is one kind of ontology that scholars can analyse and classify from an ‘objective’ and
naturalist  viewpoint,  Viveiros  de  Castro  proposes  that  perspectivism  is  a  ‘bomb’  that  shakes  the
foundations of the naturalism on which Descola’s scheme is based. Seen in this light, perspectivism is a
kind of philosophy that makes possible an entirely different anthropology shaped by indigenous concepts.
Thus, Viveiros de Castro argues against Descola’s naturalist view that animism (or perspectivism) only
involves humans perceiving animals to have human and social qualities. He suggests instead that ‘animism
is not a projection of substantive human qualities cast onto animals’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 477). Since
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Amazonians consider that animistic beings, such as animals, perceive themselves to be human, Viveiros de
Castro holds that any animistic being that puts itself ‘in the position of subject, sees itself as a member of
the human species’ (1998: 477). 
Although Viveiros de Castro has critiqued Descola for generalising animism in a way that does not account
for ethnographies of perspectivism, other anthropologists of Amazonia observe that Viveiros de Castro’s
theory of perspectivism is not always ethnographically apt among Amerindian peoples. If we return to a
discussion of the Waorani, we see that they do not neatly fit the profile of a perspectival ontology that tends
‘to describe the “predator” perspective as denoting a universally human perspective, [because] in everyday
life Waorani people often identify themselves as “prey” to outside aggressors – whether in the form of
jaguars, spirits, or human enemies’ (High 2012: 132). Unlike the perspectival groups discussed by Viveiros
de Castro, Waorani consider that being a predator ‘is antithetical to proper human sociality’ (High 2012:
138). Casey High suggests that the Waorani view may reflect a new morality, brought on by missionary
settlement, in which men are no longer ‘said to be actively trained as killers’ and where ‘openly engaging
with jaguar-spirits poses too great a threat to the present ideal of “community” (comunidad)’ (2012: 140).
People’s worlds can change over time in response to missionary conversion, social change, and a reflexive
questioning of the parameters of one’s morality, which throws doubt on the prospect of viewing entire
geographic regions as home to just one ontology, such as perspectivism.
Notwithstanding this, the oeuvres of Descola and Viveiros de Castro have been field-setting with good
reason. They have provided new platforms for the comparative study of animism, while opening up vibrant
conceptual fora for discussing the resonances between animism, perspectivism, and in some cases also
totemism (Pedersen 2001; Willerslev & Ulturgasheva 2012; Århem 2016). Viveiros de Castro’s work on
perspectivism has inspired a volume dedicated to exploring perspectival  ontologies across Inner Asia
(Pedersen, Empson & Humphrey 2007). Similarly, Descola’s study has led to the recent proposal of the
altogether new ontological schema of ‘homologism’, based on Chinese divination, the I Ching, and a Daoist
philosophy in which persons and nonhuman beings share the same interior quality and the same bodily
substance.  In  homologism,  interior  quality  and  bodily  substance  are  distilled  into  ‘a  single  energy-
substance, qi, […] knowable via the observation of natural patterns and phenomena’ (Matthews 2017: 266).
While  this  criteria  of  shared  interior  quality  and  bodily  substance  aligns  with  Descola’s  criteria  for
totemism, William Matthews proposes that the term homologism better suits the profile of the Chinese
ontology, and indeed, of any world that is predicated upon ‘shared intrinsic characteristics rather than
analogies’ (2017: 265). Thus, he suggests that homologism ‘logically displaces Totemism as the structural
counterpoint to Analogism’ in Descola’s schema (Matthews 2017: 265).
Animistic blending, blurring, and contradictions
Recent work on ontology has stimulated a re-envisioning of the kinds of beings that might populate any
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animist cosmos. ‘Hybridity’ is a recurrent theme among contemporary anthropologists, whose approaches
to ‘chaos’ (Scott 2005) or the ‘fuzzy boundaries’ (Pedersen & Willerslev 2012) between the body and the
soul evoke landmark studies on the agency and life force of technological items in transnational science
(Latour 1993; Latour & Franke 2010). Bruno Latour (1993) showed that technological items may at first
appear to be machines without the agency or life force of human beings. But on closer inspection, machines
may take on the qualities of nonhuman hybrids with agency, vitality, a life force, and personhood. Examples
of hybrids that an anthropologist might envision in animistic terms range from the part-human, part-
machine beings known as ‘cyborgs’ (Haraway 1991 [1985]) to the ‘cosmic theatre’ of ‘outer space’ that
hosted  the  joint  travels  of  US  astronauts  and  Soviet  cosmonauts  (Battaglia  2012:  S76).  However,
Richardson’s study of technological animism, where robots are treated like children, suggests pushing past
‘the emphasis  on hybridity  and relationalities between persons and things [which]  diminishes human
subjectivity in these processes [… since] while humans may interact with things like robots that trigger
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, their interactions are mediated through human socialities’ (2016: 122).
What makes these concepts of hybridity,  chaos, or fuzzy boundaries useful,  then, is that they give a
vocabulary for the ways in which animistic and other ontologies blend and blur in real life, thus leading to
contradictions or giving rise to contexts in which more than one ontology may be operative. It is instructive
in this regard to see that Eveny hunters live in a world where both totemism and animism are operative.
The Eveny concept of an open body is actually totemic, as it is based on the principle that animals and
persons  with  open  bodies  share  the  same  bodily  substances  and  interior  qualities  (Willerslev  &
Ulturgasheva 2012: 54). Eveny manipulate this totemic sensibility during the hunt by using children as
bait, who lure prey into close range for a kill. But rather than reciprocating this totemic sensibility, hunters
relate to prey with an animistic sensibility, that is, as animals with a different bodily substance that is
edible. Acknowledging the fuzzy boundaries between ‘concepts’ such as totemism and animism, then, gives
pause for thought on how they might become formative to fresh ways of envisioning anthropology and the
world at large (Corsín Jiménez & Willerslev 2007). 
The serious and humorous sides of animism
Some key anthropological approaches suggest that animism is not always taken seriously. As Willerslev
observes, it is possible that ‘underlying animistic cosmologies is a force of laughter, an ironic distance, a
making fun of the spirits, which suggests that indigenous animism is not to be taken very seriously at all’
(2013: 42). Yukaghir hunters are not averse to joking about the careful post-hunt handling of their prey to
prevent an animal’s spirit from retaliating. Thus, an elderly hunter who, according to the post-hunt custom,
crowed like a raven while removing a dead bear’s eyes with his knife was only momentarily shocked to hear
a fellow hunter call to the bear, ‘Grandfather, don’t be fooled, it’s a man, Vasili Afanasivich, who killed you
and is now blinding you!’ (Willerslev 2013: 51). Moments later, the elderly hunter burst out laughing and
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completed the work mirthfully with his hunting partner. On yet another occasion, Yukaghir hunters bought
a plastic doll  and treated it  as an idol,  feeding it  fat  and blood while bowing to it  and calling out,
‘Khoziain [Russian, “spirit-master”] needs feeding’ (Willerslev 2013: 51). Later, they explained this parody
with the quip, ‘[w]e are just having fun’ or the concession that ‘[w]e make jokes about Khoziain because
without laughter, there will be no luck. Laughing is compulsory to the game of hunting’ (Willerslev 2013:
51). Humour, after all, appears vital to Yukaghir hunting luck and success.
This playful sense of humour underpins a good deal of New Age animistic practices in Euro-American
contexts (Lindquist 1997: 15-6, see also 180-2; Houseman 2016). As the urban Swedish shaman, ‘Marie
Ericsson, an artist and a long-time neo-shamanic practitioner once expressed it, “if the sacred does not
bear  being  humoured,  it  is  not  sacred  enough  for  me”’  (Lindquist  1997:  180).  Reflecting  on  her
interlocutor’s comment, Galina Lindquist adds that ‘the sense of wonderment, and the magical freedom of
play, together with the communitas, and with the flow experienced by the performers and the audience, is
what makes neo-shamanic practices at their peak moments so fulfilling’ (1997: 181). 
If humour, wonder, and play lie at the heart of animistic practices, then it is well-worth considering the
effects that the imagination and creativity have in a variety of animistic worlds. Imaginative thinking
underpins what I and Mireille Mazard call an ‘animism beyond the soul’, which throws light on the ‘hyper-
reflexive’ relationships between anthropologists, their interlocutors, and the animistic beings or forces in
their cosmos (Swancutt & Mazard 2016: 2-5). Seen in this light, anthropological thinking may be shaped by
interlocutors  who  have  become  anthropologically-savvy  through  formal  study  or  by  informally
‘apprenticing’ off of the anthropologists they know. Key concepts in our disciplinary history, including
animism,  can  be  playfully  cycled  through  a  ‘reflexive  feedback  loop’  in  which  interlocutors  offer
anthropologically-inspired  reflections  upon their  worlds  to  anthropologists,  whose  thinking in  turn  is
informed by the conceptual work done by their interlocutors (Swancutt & Mazard 2016: 3, see also 6-7 and
10-1). When this happens, the ludic side to animism (Swancutt 2016: 80, see also 86-9) may inform not only
ethnographic  analysis,  but  also  the  imaginative  collaborations  between  anthropologists  and  their
interlocutors that have been the hallmark of anthropology (Chua 2015; Chua & Mathur 2018). 
Conclusion
Ethnographies around the world show that animism is a way of relating and attributing sentience to other
beings, forces of nature, things, and even technological items. This entry has explored anthropological
approaches  to  animism,  from  envisioning  it  as  a  philosophy  of  religion  to  building  upon  distinct
philosophical, theoretical, and ethnographic sources that suggest animism may be more than a distinct
sensibility, tendency, or style of engaging with the world. It may be an ontology in its own right.
Animism is approached from numerous directions in anthropology. It is considered to be an immanent
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rather than transcendent form of sentience. It is a way of revealing and sometimes manipulating the
consciousness,  motivation,  memories,  and  powers  of  animal  spirits,  animistic  places,  and  items  of
technology.  As  an  ontology,  animism  may  blend  and  blur  with  other  ontologies,  opening  it  up  to
contradictions, humour, creativity, imagination, inspiration, and reflexive awareness. Due to the diverse
forms of  animism worldwide,  anthropologists  have asked whether certain animistic  groups may have
undergone a history of diminution or disenchantment, which made them only attribute certain beings with
an animistic sensibility. They also relate to animism in distinct ways, as scholars who are not animists, as
scholars who advocate identifying with animists, or as scholars who are animists themselves.
Cutting across these varied approaches are competing visions of how animistic life-worlds unfold through
human, other-than-human, and beyond human sensibilities. These distinct visions raise important questions
about how we might relate to animism as a particular sensibility that can be studied ethnographically,
debated about as a philosophical and theoretical possibility, deeply identified with as a way of enriching
one’s scholarship and life, or (possibly) taken up as a sensibility of one’s own. What these big questions do
is shine a reflexive mirror onto our own humanity, pressing us to articulate what sentience is in the first
place and why we relate to others in the ways that we do.    
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